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INTRODUCTION
A Google Street View car has not driven through Haasville Road
in Bunkie, Louisiana recently.1 A satellite view shows that this road
is a long one — it winds to Highway 115 West on one end and meets
with Catfish Kitchen Road on the other.2 What is beyond Catfish
Kitchen Road is simply “unnamed.”3 A mass of trees borders
Haasville Road on its left, and near the 115 West, there are a few
structures and a white truck. It is a house, perhaps, or a farm. Pull
the map back far enough, and the patches of green become
overwhelmed by plots of tan, unused land. This is Haasville Road. It
also happens to be part of Census Tract No. 22009030600, tract type:
low-income community.4
Census Tract No. 22009030600 is an Opportunity Zone, and it is
one of 150 such zones in Louisiana.5 It is also one of 8764 such zones
in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the five U.S.
territories.6 These designated zones, classified by the IRS and
nominated by the states, are part of an investment scheme intended
to stimulate economic development and employment opportunities in
low-income communities.7 The Opportunity Zone Program requires

1. Satellite View of Haasville Road, Bunkie, LA, GOOGLE MAPS,
http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/A4LW-WB5A] (search “Haasville Road,
Bunkie, LA” then follow hyperlink).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., LIST OF DESIGNATED QUALIFIED
OPPORTUNITY
ZONES
(2018),
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Pages/OpportunityZones.aspx [https://perma.cc/37LY-TJVW].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV.
[hereinafter
Frequently
Asked
Questions],
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investors to roll-over qualified capital gains into a Qualified
Opportunity Fund (“qualified fund”), and in turn, investors receive
tax benefits depending on how long the investment is held in the
fund.8 The qualified fund then invests in eligible real estate in these
designated Opportunity Zones.9 It is seemingly a win-win situation
— investors are incentivized to channel their excess capital gains into
qualified funds in exchange or favorable tax benefits, and the
qualified funds lift up low-income communities and their residents by
developing and investing in select real estate and business
opportunities within them.10
However, not all Opportunity Zones walk and talk like Haasville
Road. In New York City, for example, the neighborhood directly
under and around the Williamsburg Bridge is also a designated
Opportunity Zone.11 The Google Street View car has clearly been
through this neighborhood recently.12 Unlike Haasville Road,
however, rows of buildings line paved streets. Several restaurants and
bars, including a well-known steakhouse, call this census tract home.13
In the District of Columbia, Buzzard Point and NoMa —
neighborhoods that have recently seen the rise of a new sports arena,
office buildings, and luxury apartments — are also designated
Opportunity Zones.14 The Google Street View car has been through
those areas recently, too.
This Note argues that the Opportunity Zone Program in
implementation may not have the intended effect of bolstering lowincome communities for three reasons. First, the Opportunity Zone
Program’s current state of disorganization has both halted monies
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions
[https://perma.cc/UXJ2-4VXZ] (last visited Apr. 21, 2019).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Novogradac Opportunity Zones Mapping Tool, NOVOGRADAC,
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/opportunity-zone-resourcecenter/guidance/novogradac-opportunity-zones-mapping-tool
[https://perma.cc/UTC4-A3E4] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (picturing Census Tract
No. 36047054900).
12. Satellite View of South 6 Street & Broadway, Brooklyn, NY, GOOGLE MAPS,
http://maps.google.com [https://perma.cc/7KNP-2JG2] (search “South 6th St. &
Broadway, Brooklyn, NY” then follow hyperlink).
13. Id. (showing the famous Peter Luger Steak House).
14. Adam Looney, Will Opportunity Zones Help Distressed Residents or Be a
Tax Cut for Gentrification?, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/02/26/will-opportunity-zones-helpdistressed-residents-or-be-a-tax-cut-for-gentrification/
[https://perma.cc/PM3B74RV].
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flowing into low-income communities and left the Program without
any meaningful way in which to collect and analyze data. Secondly,
some of the designated tracts have already begun to show signs of
gentrification and revitalization, and, thus, any investments poured
into these areas may be unnecessarily and even recklessly channeled.
Finally, past zoning programs with tax incentives carried out both
overseas and domestically have demonstrated that such programs
have failed at creating employment opportunities and displaced lowincome residents due to rapid gentrification practices.
Part I of this Note provides background on the Opportunity Zone
Program, its legislative history, and the current state of the Program.
Part II questions whether the Opportunity Zone Program can achieve
the intended effect of bolstering low-income communities and their
residents, and argues that in its current state, it may not be able to.
This Note argues that the Opportunity Zone Program may be
unsuccessful because of its current disorganization, as evidenced by
the fact that some Zones have been wrongfully designated, and the
fact that past land zoning initiatives and tax incentives have been
previously unsuccessful in creating meaningful employment
opportunities and community developments and initiatives. Finally,
Part III suggests measures for the IRS and participating agencies to
address and adopt moving forward regarding the implementation of
the Opportunity Zone Program to better serve the communities and
individuals the legislature intended.
I. THE CONCEPTION OF THE OPPORTUNITY ZONE PROGRAM: FROM
THEN TO NOW
A. Legislative History
Although the Investing in Opportunity Act (IIOA) was pushed
through in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,15 the genesis of
attaching tax incentives to capital gains investment into the nation’s
low-income neighborhoods was first promulgated in a white paper by
Jared Bernstein and Kevin A. Hassett for the Economic Innovation
15. The legislation was introduced into the House and Senate on February 2,
2017, where it was referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the
Senate Finance Committee. There were 95 cosponsors for the Investing in
Opportunity Act — 14 from the Senate and 81 from the House. S. 392, 155th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2017); Investing in Opportunity Act, H.R. 828, 115th Cong. (2017–18),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/828/text
[https://perma.cc/LJ8N-ECEJ]; Investing in Opportunity Act, S. 293, 115th Cong.
(2017–18),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/293/all-info
[https://perma.cc/LJ8N-ECEJ].
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Group.16 The white paper recognized the disparity between certain
areas of the country faring “remarkably well and nearing or
exceeding their pre-recession economic states” and others “facing
chronic rates of long-term unemployment and historically low levels
of new investment.”17 Bernstein and Hassett based their model, in
part, off of failures of previous incentive structures designed to spur
economic development in distressed zones.18 Their model proposed
tapping into the “power of intermediaries” — that is, private equity
firms, banks, mutual funds, and other small businesses — to pool
assets and incentive investments in distressed regions via tax
benefits.19 By February 2017, Bernstein and Hassett’s suggestion had
found its way into Congress in the form of a bipartisan bill authored
by Senators Corey Booker and Tim Scott and Congressmen Pat
Tiberi and Ron Kind.20 Similarly recognizing the vast amount of
untapped capital gains “just sitting there”21 to the tune of nearly $6.1
trillion, the legislation devised a way to channel those funds into
distressed communities by incentivizing long-term private investment
through tax reform, essentially adopting the model promulgated in
Bernstein and Hassett’s white paper.22

16. See JARED BERNSTEIN & KEVIN A. HASSETT, UNLOCKING PRIVATE CAPITAL
TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DISTRESSED AREAS (2015), https://eig.org/wp-

content/uploads/2015/04/Unlocking-Private-Capital-to-Facilitate-Growth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5VZJ-6CFT]; see also Noah Buhayar, Will ‘Opportunity Zones’
Help the Rich, the Poor or Both?, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/will-opportunity-zoneshelp-the-rich-thepoor-or-both/2019/01/04/2a1e153a-0fe1-11e9-8f0c-6f878a26288a_story.html
[https://perma.cc/SE6F-6XU3] (noting that Bernstein was an economic advisor to Joe
Biden when he was Vice President and that Hassett is currently chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers).
17. BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 16, at 2.
18. See id. at 11–16.
19. See id. at 16–20 (pointing to over $2 trillion in unrealized, unused capital gains
that could be funneled into distressed communities).
20. The Investing in Opportunity Act, OPPORTUNITY ZONE DATABASE,
https://opportunitydb.com/guide/iioa [https://perma.cc/ZLS2-RQP9] (last visited Oct.
28, 2019).
21. See id.; see also 162 CONG. REC. S5125, 5119-01 (daily ed. July 14, 2016)
(statement of Sen. Scott); BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 16, at 16–17
(recognizing trillions in unrealized capital gains that could be redeployed into regions
in need of economic development).
22. 164 CONG. REC. S1656, 1646-03 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2018) (statement of Sen.
Cruz); see also How Tax Reform Could Revive American Entrepreneurship: Hearing
Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (noting Senator Pat Tiberi,
speaking in favor for the IIOA’s passage, supported the theory of tax reform as a
means of “removing artificial barriers” to entrepreneurial stimulation).
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The IIOA was designed with the 52 million Americans living in the
nation’s low-income, distressed communities in mind.23 In theory, by
financially empowering these communities in need and lifting them
out of their distress, businesses and new opportunities would be
drawn to these now-viable zones for investment, development, and
more.24 In turn, the residents of these low-income communities
would have the chance to showcase “their creativity, their
intelligence, and their work ethic” through the employment
opportunities and more that would arise from financial stimulation
and revitalization of these neighborhoods.25
B. The Framework of the Opportunity Zone Program
The Opportunity Zone Program is in part premised on longevity.
The longer capital gains are held in a qualified fund, the more
attractive the tax incentives are to investors.26 There are few
restrictions on the capital gains that can be invested into a qualified
fund, namely that the property producing the capital gains need only
be sold or exchanged with a person “unrelated” to the property
itself.27 The language of the statute in regards to eligible capital gains
reads “any property,”28 which investors have interpreted to mean that
gains from the sale of “business, stocks, bonds, cryptocurrencies or
any other type of investment”29 may all be transferred into a qualified
fund.
A qualified fund is an investment vehicle established as either a
partnership or a corporation for federal taxation purposes.30
Establishing a fund is an endeavor in paperwork above all else — a
partnership, corporation, or limited liability company treated as a
partnership or corporation for federal taxation purposes files Form
8996 with its income tax return to declare that the fund is organized

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

164 CONG. REC S667-05 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2018) (statement of Sen. Tim Scott).

See id.
Id.

I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017).

Id.
Id.

Meg Epstein, Find Your Investment Opportunity in an Opportunity Zone,
(Feb.
4,
2019),
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesrealestatecouncil/2019/02/04/find-yourinvestment-opportunity-in-an-opportunity-zone/#e80edebe4c64
[https://perma.cc/M5BH-TX8R].
30. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7.
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for purposes of investing in qualified Opportunity Zone property.31 If
the taxpayer is certifying as a qualified fund for the first time, it must
submit a statement by the end of its first year detailing the fund’s
purpose of investing in qualified Opportunity Zone property and a
description of the property’s business.32 Beyond the entity’s selfcertification as a qualified fund, the taxpayer need only roll over its
qualified capital gains into the qualified fund within 180 days of the
sale of the property and hold 90%33 of its assets in qualified
Opportunity Zone property from between the last day of the first sixmonth period of the fund’s taxable year to the last day of the fund’s
taxable year.34 No further approval process by the IRS is required.35
Once an investor rolls over capital gains into a qualified fund, the
fund itself must invest the monies into qualified Opportunity Zone
property within 31 months.36 Except for investment into so-called sin
establishments,37 the definition of what constitutes qualified property
is extensive.
Qualified Opportunity Zone stock,38 qualified
31. Corporations and partnerships that are organized and operate as a qualified
fund must file, in addition to Form 8996, either Form 1120, Form 1120-F, Form 1120REIT, Form 1120S, or Form 1065. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 8996
INSTRUCTIONS
2
(2018)
[hereinafter
FORM
8996
INSTRUCTIONS],
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-dft/i8996—dft.pdf [https://perma.cc/79YB-KFE9]. The
entity will also continue to file Form 8996 annually to make known that the fund
meets the standards set forth in I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017). See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., FORM 8996 (2018) [hereinafter FORM 8996], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irsdft/f8996—dft.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCL4-ZU7U].
32. FORM 8996 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 31, at 2.
33. According to the IRS, the 90% standard is “determined by the average of the
percentage of qualified opportunity zone property held in the QOF as measured on:
1. The last day of the first 6-month period of the tax year of the QOF, and 2. The last
day of the tax year of the QOF.” Id. at 1.
34. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017).
35. Id.; see Eligible Taxpayers Will Self-Certify to Be a Qualified Opportunity
NOVOGRADAC
(Apr.
25,
2018,
4:00
PM),
Fund,
https://www.novoco.com/news/eligible-taxpayers-will-self-certify-be-qualifiedopportunity-fund [https://perma.cc/W85Y-CQKE].
36. Steve Rosenthal, IRS Proposes Generous Rules For Opportunity Zone
Investors, But What Will They Mean For Communities?, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2018, 5:34
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenrosenthal/2018/10/23/irs-proposes-generousrules-for-opportunity-zone-investors-but-what-will-they-mean-forcommunities/#69b2880e7ff1 [https://perma.cc/FR8Z-V9RH].
37. The IRS defines a “sin establishment” as a “private or commercial golf course,
country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility, suntan facility, racetrack or other
facility used for gambling, or any store the principal business of which is the sale of
alcoholic beverages for consumption off premises.” I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017); see also
§ 144(c)(6)(B) (2009).
38. Qualified Opportunity Zone stock is:
any stock of a domestic corporation that a [qualified fund] acquires after
2017 from the corporation, either directly or through an underwriter, solely
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Opportunity Zone partnership interest,39 and qualified Opportunity
Zone business property40 all constitute eligible Opportunity Zone
investments. Additional proposed regulations issued by the IRS also
provided three safe harbors with which to determine whether a
business meets the 50% test to qualify as a qualified Opportunity

in exchange for cash. The corporation must be a qualified opportunity zone
business . . . when the stock is purchased. The corporation must be
organized for the purpose of being a qualified opportunity zone business.
FORM 8996 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 31, at 1. Furthermore, the corporation must
qualify as a qualified Opportunity Zone business for substantially all of the time the
qualified fund holds the stock. A qualified Opportunity Zone business is a business
or trade if:
substantially all of its owned or leased tangible property is qualified
opportunity zone business property . . . and if the trade or business satisfies
all of the following tests. 1. The business generates at least 50% of its total
gross income from the active conduct of a qualifying trade or business; 2.
The business uses a substantial part of its intangible property in the active
conduct of any such business; 3. Less than 5% of the average of the total
unadjusted basis of the property of the business is from nonqualified
financial property; and 4. The business is not a private or commercial golf
course, country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility, suntan facility,
racetrack or other facility used for gambling, or any store the principal
business of which is the sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption off
premises.
Id. at 1–2 (emphasis added).
39. Qualified Opportunity Zone partnership interest is:
any capital or profits interest in a domestic partnership that a [qualified
fund] acquires after 2017 in exchange for cash. The partnership must be a
qualified opportunity zone business when the [qualified fund] acquires the
interest. The partnership must be organized for the purpose of being a
qualified opportunity zone business. The partnership must qualify as a
qualified opportunity zone business for substantially all of the time the
[qualified fund] holds the interest.
Id. at 1.
40. Qualified Opportunity Zone business property is:
tangible property that a [qualified fund] acquires after 2017 and uses in a
trade or business and that satisfies both of the following tests. 1. The use of
the property in the qualified opportunity zone originates with the [qualified
fund], or the [qualified fund] substantially improves the property; and 2.
During substantially all of the [qualified fund’s] holding period for such
property, substantially all of the use of such property was in a qualified
opportunity zone.
Id. at 1. A qualified fund “substantially improves” property to the satisfaction of the
first prong if:
during any 30-month period beginning after the date of the acquisition of
such property, additions to basis with respect to such property in the hands
of the [qualified fund] are more than an amount equal to the adjusted basis
of such property at the beginning of such 30-month period in the hands of
the [qualified fund].
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
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Zone business.41 In practice, the proposed regulations will open up a
wider range of acceptable qualifying businesses in Opportunity Zone
areas, from coffee shops to marijuana dispensaries in states where the
drug has been legalized.42
The Opportunity Zone Program rewards investors in a triplepronged manner via deferral, reduction, and exclusion.43 First,
investors are permitted to defer tax on capital gains invested in a
qualified fund until either the date on which the investment in the
fund is sold or exchanged, or on December 31, 2026 — whichever falls
first.44 Second, the Program rewards the longevity of an investment.45
Depending on the length of time an investor holds a qualified fund
investment, he may be eligible for a step-up in basis on the original
investment.46 If an investor holds an investment for over five years
but less than seven, he or she is eligible for a 10% step-up in basis on
the original investment.47 If the investor holds the investment for at
least seven, but less than ten years, an additional 5% is added, leading
to a 15% step-up in basis on the original investment.48 Finally, for the

41. If at least half of the hours the business’ employees or contractors are spent in
the Opportunity Zone, half of the business’ services are conducted within the Zone,
or if the business’ management and operations are based within the Zone, the
business may qualify for the incentive. Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, 84
Fed. Reg., 18,652, 18,658 (May 1, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); see also
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
42. See Jim Tankersley, Treasury Issues Rules on Tax Breaks for Opportunity
Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019) [Tankersley, Treasury Issues Rules],
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/business/economy/opportunity-zones-treasuryregulations.html [https://perma.cc/W7S3-4AU2].
43. See The Investing in Opportunity Act, supra note 20 (noting that there are
three main tax benefits to entice investors).
44. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7.
45. Id.
46. A step-up in basis as related to Opportunity Zone investments is essentially
an adjustment in the total amount an investor will pay capital gains taxes on. For
example, if an investor invests $100,000 into a qualified fund and later holds the
investment in the fund for between five to seven years, he or she is eligible to pay
capital gains taxes on a lower investment amount. The percent-reduction is known as
the “step-up.” See id.; see also I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017); infra note 48.
47. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7.
48. An example is useful for illustrative purposes. If an investor transfers over
$100,000 into a qualified fund and holds the investment for over five years but less
than seven, he will pay capital gains tax on $90,000 instead of the original $100,000
investment, representing a 10% step-up in basis. If the investor holds the investment
between seven to ten years, he will pay capital gains tax on $85,000 instead of the
original investment amount, representing a 15% step-up in basis. Since capital gains
tax may only be deferred until December 31, 2026, 2019 is a critical year for investors
interested in stepping-up their original investment by 15% for tax purposes. The
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patient investor that holds the investment for at least ten years, the
basis of the investment shall be increased to “its fair market value on
the date that the [qualified fund] is sold or exchanged.”49 In other
words, a taxpayer can exclude capital gains tax due on the profits
resulting from the sale or exchange of a qualified fund’s investment
after it is held for ten or more years.50 Unsurprisingly, the exclusion
prong is the most attractive tax benefit to many interested investors.51
As of September 2019, there are 117 qualified funds in operation
with a total investment capacity of approximately $37.4 billion.52
These funds are managed by a range of fund managers, from real
estate companies and real estate investment groups53 to global
investment firms54 and hedge funds. Several qualified funds require a
minimum investment buy-in, ranging from $25,000 to $1 million, and
specify the type of real estate the fund is interested in investing in.55

reduced tax on the original capital gains investment would thus be due in April 2027.

See id.
49. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 7.

50. An example is useful for illustrative purposes. If an investor rolled over
$100,000 into a qualified fund in April 2019 and sold that investment in May 2029, he
would be eligible for both a 15% step-up in basis on December 31, 2026, and pay
capital gains tax on $85,000 come April 2027. The investor is further entitled to an
exclusion of capital gains accrued in the fund since the investment was held for at
least ten years. Thus, if the original investment made $50,000 in the ten years, the
investor would not be required to pay capital gains tax on that profit. See I.R.C. §
1400Z-2 (2017); see also Epstein, supra note 29.
51. See What Are Qualified Opportunity Funds?, OPPORTUNITY ZONE
DATABASE,
https://opportunitydb.com/guide/opportunity-funds/
[https://perma.cc/ZC8B-88A7] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
52. . Opportunity Zone Fund Directory, OPPORTUNITY ZONE DATABASE,
https://opportunitydb.com/funds/ [https://perma.cc/Z62P-K6GE] (last visited Oct. 28,
2019) (providing a directory of 117 Qualified Opportunity Funds from around the
nation as of September 23, 2019).
53. RXR Realty, a New York-based real estate company, and CIM Group, a Los
Angeles-based real estate investment group, for example, both manage qualified
funds. Id. CIM Group currently manages a $5 billion fund. Id.
54. For example, Fundrise Advisors, LLC and SkyBridge Capital both manage
qualified funds named Fundrise Opportunity Fund and SkyBridge Opportunity Zone
REIT, respectively. SkyBridge Capital, as of March 2019, has a fund size of $3 billion
and is targeting a $1 billion fund. Id.; see also Keith Larsen, So Many Opportunity
Zones, So Many Questions for Developers, Investors, REAL DEAL (Feb. 15, 2019,
2:30 PM), https://therealdeal.com/miami/2019/02/15/so-many-opportunity-zones-somany-questions-for-developers-investors/ [https://perma.cc/JT9S-MQDT].
55. Investment real estate types include hotels, multi-family housing, office and
residential spaces, commercial spaces, and student housing. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
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C. How Opportunity Zones Were Designated
Per I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(b)(1), a qualified Opportunity Zone is a lowincome community population census tract.56 To qualify as an
Opportunity Zone, the tract must have been nominated by the chief
executive officer of the state where the tract is located no later than
the end of the determination period,57 and the Secretary of the
Treasury must have been notified in writing of the nomination.58
Notably, tracts bordering low-income tracts, known as contiguous
tracts, were also eligible for nomination if the median family income
did not exceed 125% of the adjusted low-income tract.59 Currently,
there are 8764 qualified Opportunity Zones designated in the 50
states, the District of Columbia, and the five major U.S. territories,
230 of which are contiguous tracts.60 State governors were permitted
to nominate up to 25% of their eligible tracts as potential Opportunity

56. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(b)(1) (2017). The IRS defines a “low-income community” as
any population census tract where the poverty rate is at least 20%. If the census tract
is located within a metropolitan area, the median family income for such tract may
not exceed 80% of the greater statewide median family income, or the metropolitan
area median income. If the census tract is located outside a metropolitan area, the
median family income for the tract may not exceed 80% of the statewide median
family income. I.R.C. § 45(D)(e) (2018); see also What Are Opportunity Zones?,
OPPORTUNITY ZONE DATABASE, https://opportunitydb.com/guide/opportunity-zones
[https://perma.cc/ZLP2-4XD5] (last visited Mar. 27, 2019) (noting that there are
31,866 census low-income census tracts in the United States, the District of Columbia,
and the five major territories); Ronald Li, Will New Opportunity Zones Attract
Investors to the Bay Area’s Poorest Areas?, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018, 4:06
PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/04/26/us-opportunityzones-taxes-vallejo-mare-island.html [https://perma.cc/TQ4V-NMYM] (noting that
an area’s poverty rate was based on American Community Survey data taken
between 2011 to 2015 as the country was coming back from the recession).
57. The IRS defines the “determination period” as the “90-day period beginning
on the date of enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act . . . .” I.R.C. § 1400Z1(c)(2)(B) (2017).
58. Id.
59. BRETT THEODOS ET AL., DID STATES MAXIMIZE THEIR OPPORTUNITY ZONE
SELECTIONS?
2
(2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98445/did_states_maximize_their
_opportunity_zone_selections_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NEQ-LY42] (noting that
contiguous tracts could not represent more than 5% of the total number of tracts
selected).
60. Id. (noting that there were 42,176 eligible tracts in total throughout the 50
states, the District of Columba, and the five major U.S. territories); see also List of
OPPORTUNITY
ZONE
DATABASE,
Opportunity
Zones
by
State,
https://opportunitydb.com/location [https://perma.cc/2AHM-FAJ6] (last visited Oct.
28, 2019).
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Zones, or in a state with fewer than 100 qualified tracts, at least 25
tracts.61
In practice, state governors and heads of state nominated tracts
using various criteria and methodology.
In Pennsylvania, for
example, the Department of Community and Economic
Development spearheaded the nomination process, taking feedback
and commentary from “individuals, cities, counties, legislators, and
organizations” in regard to which neighborhoods most deserved the
designations.62 Pennsylvania gave special consideration to the state’s
poorest areas, taking into account the poverty rate, unemployment
rate, and median family income. The state also considered anchor
establishments such as airports and hospitals, and the potential to
develop affordable housing in the tract, too.63 In Ohio, the
Development Services Agency worked with “local units of
government . . . development
professionals,
development
organizations, port authorities, and more” and “received over 100
calls and 238 online submissions, as well as letters of support” in
contemplating which eligible tracts to ultimately nominate.64 Tracts
that demonstrated employment creation potential were awarded
nomination priority, for example, “local cooperation” — that is, the
number of submitters that nominated a single tract — and “future
commitments of public/private [sic] investment,” to name a few.65
The Treasury Department released the official designations based on
the states’ nominations.66

61. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 59, at 1.
62. Qualified Opportunity Zones, PA. DEP’T. CMTY. & ECON. DEV.,
https://dced.pa.gov/programs-funding/federal-funding-opportunities/qualifiedopportunity-zones/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2019); see also Pennsylvania Submits
Nominations for Qualified Opportunity Zones to U.S. Department of Treasury,
GOVERNOR TOM WOLF [hereinafter Pennsylvania Submits Nominations],
https://www.governor.pa.gov/pennsylvania-submits-nominations-qualifiedopportunity-zones-u-s-department-treasury/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) (noting that
Pennsylvania had 1197 census tracts eligible for Opportunity Zone designation).
63. Qualified Opportunity Zones, supra note 62.
64. Opportunity
Zones,
OHIO
DEV.
SERV.
AGENCY,
https://development.ohio.gov/bs/bs_censustracts.htm [https://perma.cc/7MTQ-J9PB]
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
65. Id.
66. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, IRS Announce Final Round of
Opportunity
Zone
Designations
(June
14,
2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0414
[https://perma.cc/ZC264EYD].
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II. THE CURRENT ISSUES FRUSTRATING THE OPPORTUNITY ZONE
PROGRAM
The Opportunity Zone Program aims to bolster low-income
communities and their residents by injecting capital to spur economic
development and employment opportunities in these neighborhoods.
However, the Program’s current state of disorganization, the
wrongful designation of several Zones, and failures of past land
zoning programs with built-in tax incentives both domestically and
internationally suggest that without further safeguards, regulations,
and monitoring, the Opportunity Zone Program may not end up
achieving its goals.
This Part addresses some of the issues currently frustrating the
Program’s purpose. Section II.A discusses how the lack of clarity in
regard to the IRS’s regulations have given qualified funds pause when
it comes to making investments in these zones. Next, Section II.B
questions whether certain Opportunity Zones have been wrongfully
designated. Lastly, Section II.C looks into two past land zoning
programs with built-in tax incentives, Enterprise Zoning, and the New
Markets Tax Credit, and suggests these initiatives are not as
beneficial to local communities as they appear due to their cost
ineffectiveness and the potential to displace rather than aid lowincome community residents.
A. The Opportunity Zone Program Is Currently Disorganized and
Without Meaningful Monitoring Systems
There is a massive amount of capital ready to deploy in the 117
qualified funds.67 Some qualified funds are already making headway
on their investment portfolios.68 The Cresset-Diversified fund, for
example,69 announced a joint venture with Hines, a real estate
investment firm, to develop The Preston, a multi-story residential

67. Opportunity Zone Fund Directory, supra note 52 (noting that some funds are
targeting fund sizes of $1 billion and over).
68. Id.; see also Cresset-Diversified QOZ Fund Enters into Joint Venture with
Hines Fund’s First Qualified Opportunity Zone Investment, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 6,
2019)
[hereinafter
Cresset
Fund],
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190206005360/en/Cresset-DiversifiedQOZ-Fund-Enters-Joint-Venture-Hines [https://perma.cc/VK6Y-XM99].
69. The Cresset Diversified Fund is managed by Cresset Capital Management and
has a fund size of $500 million. The fund is primarily interested in affordable housing,
hotel, industrial, office, retail, and storage investment opportunities throughout the
U.S. Opportunity Zone Fund Directory, supra note 52.

130

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

building in downtown Houston.70 The building will house 373
apartment units featuring “ten-foot ceilings, engineered wood
flooring, and Italian wood cabinetry,” and will provide its residents
with amenities such as a fitness center, skydeck, and “23,500-squarefoot tenth floor amenity level with resort-style pool, covered terrace,
gas BBQ grills, and lounge seating.”71 The luxury apartment building
will also boast 6804 square-feet of ground-level commercial space.72
Several other qualified funds, however, have hesitated in deploying
their raised capital despite the important 2019 deadline.73 According
to these qualified funds, there are both simple basics and minutiae
that must be clarified before they feel comfortable with making
sizable investments.74 In fairness to the IRS, the agency has
attempted to address and provide clarification to Opportunity Zone
investors. In February 2019, it held a public hearing to gather
questions and concerns about the Program, an event attended by
approximately 200 people.75 Amongst the questions put forth were
whether a sale of an Opportunity Zone asset and the subsequent
purchase of another would start the clock over again in regards to the
ten-year holding period, and what exactly “substantially improv[ing]”
an asset to qualify for the tax benefit means.76 On April 17, just 64
days later, the IRS issued a lengthy set of regulations addressing

70. Cresset Fund, supra note 68.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Interested investors must invest their capital gains by the end of 2019 if they
want to benefit from the 15% step-up in basis on their original investments, as
investments must be held within a qualified fund for at least seven years by
December 31, 2026 to qualify. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2017); see also Allison
Nagel, Investors Need Final Guidance to Move Forward on Opportunity Zones, but
Some See More Risk in the Wait, BISNOW (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.bisnow.com/san-francisco/news/opportunity-zones/reading-the-tealeaves-continued-uncertainty-means-that-some-have-embraced-oz-investment-whileothers-wait-97400 [https://perma.cc/W9BA-MFM7] (noting that some investors are
hesitant to move forward without additional clarification); Larsen, supra note 54
(“[Investors] remain cautious enough over of the program’s many unanswered
questions that few have deployed much of the capital raised.”).
74. See Larsen, supra note 54.
75. Id.; see also Jim Tankersley, Investors Eagerly Await Trump Rules on
Opportunity Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Tankersley, Investors],
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/us/politics/opportunity-zones.html
[https://perma.cc/R4T6-AE5B] (noting that the IRS hearing was attended by and
large by “investors and civic leaders requesting changes and additions to the rules in
several areas”).
76. Larsen, supra note 54; see also Tankersley, Investors, supra note 75.
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several of these concerns.77 While it remains unclear if these newlyissued regulations have provided enough clarification for qualified
funds to move forward with their investments, a companion
document released by the Treasury Department asking the public for
advice and guidance as to how to collect and track qualified funds’
investment movement suggests that one, there are still several
components of the Program that require attention, and two, that data
collection has not been a priority thus far.78 The lack of meaningful
monitoring systems stands against the Program’s purpose, given that
data collection would provide invaluable information as to how the
Program is operating at the ground level, and more importantly, if it
is, in fact, benefitting low-income communities and their residents.
B. The Opportunity Zone Program Inaccurately Designated Several
Zones
While states were required to adhere to certain criteria in
nominating tracts for Opportunity Zone designation, the question
remains as to whether or not some of the tracts that ultimately earned
designations truly deserved their inclusion.79 Fresno County in
California, for example, a few hours’ drive from the Bay Area and
home to 47 designated Opportunity Zones, is lauded for its “meltingpot atmosphere, the arts scene, the nearby nature, and the affordable
housing.”80 This depiction is not to say that Fresno does not have its
share of problems: poverty and pollution are very much real and
pressing issues present in the area.81 Furthermore, unlike the nearby
Silicon Valley, which is teeming with new business and development,

77. 84 Fed. Reg.. 18,691 (May 1, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1)
(addressing the reinvestment issue, and allowing for a one-year grace period for a
qualified fund to reinvest the capital upon the sale of a qualified Opportunity Zone
asset). The regulations do not provide further clarification as to what “substantially
improve” means, rather, they redirect the investor back to the original set of
instructions for Form 8996. Id. Given that the IRS only released the first set of
regulations in October 2018, eight months after the first Opportunity Zones were
designated, the turnaround for the release of the second set of regulations was quick
in comparison. Id.
78. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON DATA
COLLECTION AND TRACKING FOR QUALIFIED OPPORTUNITY ZONES 1 (2019)
[hereinafter REQUEST FOR INFORMATION], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/reg120186-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5DK-8YBL].
79. See Annie Lowrey, Fixing America’s Forgotten Places, ATLANTIC (July 24,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/07/how-do-we-help-thisplace/565862/ [https://perma.cc/T37Q-UKZX].
80. Id.
81. Id.

132

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

technology companies have not flocked to Fresno to set up shop
despite the area’s affordability and proximity to several major
California cities.82 Still, Fresno County is a place that “feels on the
cusp” — it has a strong industrial base, affordable real estate, highway
foot-traffic, and a “steady supply of educated workers” due to its
proximity to California State University, Fresno and other higher
educational institutions.83 One of Fresno’s designated Opportunity
Zones is home to new development for Amazon, Ulta Beauty, and
Volkswagen distribution centers.84 Another Zone includes a mixed
housing and retail commercial development, a project that has been
in the development stages for quite some time.85
A second California case study further enlightens the potential
inaccuracy in Zone designation.
The downtown Berkeley
neighborhood, adjacent to the University of California, Berkeley
campus, has a 44.6% poverty rate by-and-large due to the high
number of students living in the area.86 On a numerical basis, the
neighborhood technically meets all requirements to qualify as a lowincome community.
But whether or not the area is truly
impoverished is up for debate, given the fact that many students are
neither employed on a full-time basis nor do they earn full-time
salaries.87 Nevertheless, Berkeley’s economic development officials
audibly supported the downtown neighborhood’s inclusion in the
Opportunity Zone Program on two premises — one, that the
neighborhood meets both the income and poverty requirements
required and two, that “future opportunity for transit-oriented

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. FRESNO CTY. ECON. DEV. CORP., SPOTLIGHT ON FRESNO COUNTY: 2018 REAL
ESTATE
FORECAST
14
(2018),
https://www.fresnoedc.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/2018-REF-Publication.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMG6-JNCE]
(showing Amazon, Ulta, Volkswagen, and other companies are developing industrial
sites in South Fresno); George Hostetter, President Trump’s “Opportunity Zones”
Could Help the Majority of Fresno, SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY SUN (Mar. 30, 2018),
http://sjvsun.com/news/fresno/president-trumps-opportunity-zones-help-majorityfresno [https://perma.cc/C69M-BL8L].
85. FRESNO CTY. ECON. DEV. CORP., supra note 84.
86. Li, supra note 56 (noting that the downtown Berkeley neighborhood is
adjacent to the University of California, Berkeley campus).
87. Id. There are roughly 46,000-plus UC-Berkeley students in the downtown
Berkeley neighborhood, 36,000 of which are undergraduate students and 10,125 of
which are graduate students. There are also approximately 13,000 additional UCBerkeley faculty and staff who either study or work in the neighborhood.
DOWNTOWN BERKELEY, HAVE YOU BEEN TO DOWNTOWN BERKELEY LATELY? 5,
http://www.downtownberkeley.com/docs/Retail_Brochure_FORWEB_rev11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GWF-HTN4] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
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development [in downtown Berkeley]” could benefit poorer
neighborhoods, “with residents easily commuting downtown on the
BART [train].”88
Though California has the greatest number of Opportunity Zones,
leading with a total of 879 Zones, only a quarter of the state’s eligible
low-income tracts were ultimately designated and accepted into the
Program.89 The downtown Berkeley Opportunity Zone was far from
the poorest tract in California designated, let alone in Berkeley
itself.90 Yet, three-quarters of California’s low-income communities
will go without Opportunity Zone funding despite their potential
need in favor of downtown Berkeley.91 Then, there is also the glaring
evidence that some of the designated Zones do not appear to be as
impoverished as the numbers suggest, due to the use of outdated
census data and inflated poverty rates in defining the nation’s lowincome communities.92 The downtown Berkeley neighborhood
elucidates this. While the neighborhood’s poverty rate far exceeds
both the national and California’s poverty rate — 14% and 19%
respectively — downtown Berkeley’s overall unemployment rate sits
at a mere 2.4%.93 Oakland, by comparison, has a 3.7% unemployment
rate, and California overall has a 4.6% unemployment rate.94
Downtown Berkeley also has a median home price of around $1
million.95 Altogether, these data points suggest a discrepancy
between the reported poverty rates and reality.
Fresno County and Berkeley are not unique in regard to
questionable designations; rather, it is a rampant problem seen
throughout the nation’s Opportunity Zones. In San Francisco, the
88. Li, supra note 56.
89. What Are Opportunity Zones?, supra note 56.
90. Li, supra note 56 (“More investment could benefit poorer
neighborhoods . . . .”) (emphasis added).
91. Id. (noting that poorer tracts in South and West Berkeley were also included
in as designated Opportunity Zones).
92. HILARY GELFOND & ADAM LOONEY, BROOKINGS INST., LEARNING FROM
OPPORTUNITY ZONES: HOW TO IMPROVE PLACE-BASED POLICIES 1 (2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Looney_OpportunityZones_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/J579-ALWA] (“[T]he data used to identify places
worthy of federal subsidies after 2018 dates as far back as 2011.”).
93. Li, supra note 56 (positing that the low poverty rate can be attributed to the
neighborhood’s student residents); see also Sammy Caiola, California Has One of the
Nation’s Highest Poverty Rates, Again, CAPITAL PUB. RADIO (Sept. 12, 2018),
http://www.capradio.org/articles/2018/09/12/california-has-one-of-the-nations-highestpoverty-rates-again/ [https://perma.cc/4H2T-KZQK] (noting California’s high
poverty rates).
94. Li, supra note 56.
95. Id.
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South of Market (SoMa) neighborhood, which has seen billions of
dollars in new construction in the past ten years, was considered for
nomination as a designated Opportunity Zone, as was the area near
Stanford University in Palo Alto, due to its high student population.96
In the District of Columbia, the Buzzard Point neighborhood
adjacent to D.C. United’s brand-new soccer stadium, Audi Field, is a
designated Opportunity Zone even though hundreds of millions in
upcoming investment have already been planned for both the stadium
and surrounding area.97 In New York City, a tract in the Upper East
Side, bounded by Central Park, Park Avenue, East 98th Street, and
East 106th Street, is a designated Opportunity Zone. Across Central
Park in Hell’s Kitchen, the tract bounded by the Hudson River, 10th
Avenue, West 58th Street, and West 50th Street is also a designated
Zone, despite the fact that just some 16 blocks away, the Hudson
Yards residential, office, and shopping mega-complex — “one of the
biggest real estate projects in the country in recent years” — opened
in March 2019.98
In Nevada, local businesspeople lobbied
policymakers to get Storey County, the seat to the Tahoe-Reno
Industrial Center, onto the list of eligible zones even though the
County was initially ineligible for designation.99 These communities,
adjacent to affluent neighborhoods and new developments, are not as
deprived as other areas in the same city, and thus begs the question as
to whether development would have inevitably occurred there

96. Id. (pointing out that both Zones were removed from consideration as
designated Opportunity Zones after feedback from the cities in question).
97. Looney, supra note 14 (noting that according to one estimate, half of D.C.’s
low-income neighborhoods are in fact, already gentrified — the same can also be said
of cities such as Portland, Seattle, Minneapolis, and Atlanta); see also Steven Goff,

D.C. United Will Open Audi Field on July 14, Setting Up All-Star Week on
Waterfront,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
4,
2018),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soccer-insider/wp/2018/01/04/d-c-united-toopen-audi-field-july-14-vs-vancouver-whitecaps
[https://perma.cc/4S56-BQKX]
(discussing how Audi Field, a 20,000-capacity sports arena two blocks from Nationals
Park, opened in July 2018, at a cost of more than $300 million).
98. Azi Paybarah, Hudson Yards: The Making of a $25 Billion Neighborhood,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
18,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/nyregion/newyorktoday/nyc-news-hudsonyards.html [https://perma.cc/L9ND-HLAM] (according to public records and an
analysis by the New School, the complex cost an estimated $6 billion in tax breaks
and other government assistance).
99. GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92, at 7 (“Clearly, this play [to get Storey
County on the list of eligible Opportunity Zones] was not motivated by a desire to
help improve conditions of poor Nevada residents, but instead to deliver tax benefits
for Nevada investors.”).
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regardless of the Program’s incentives, and if the investments are
targeted at the neighborhoods most in need.100
Studies support the proposition that states did not select Zones
that are most in need of the designations.101 In 2018, Brett Theodos,
Brady Meixell, and Carl Hedman conducted a study inquiring into
whether or not states maximized their Opportunity Zone selections,
and specifically, examined recent investment flow into the designated
Zones, if any.102 They ranked each eligible census tract from one-toten, with ten representing areas attracting the highest level of
investment and one representing the lowest.103 While approximately
one-third of designated Opportunity Zones were in fact tracts with
historically low levels of investment, 28% of designated Zones had
also attracted high levels of investment even before the conception of
the Opportunity Zone Program.104 On average, the majority of
states’ investment score hovered between five and six,105 suggesting
that many Opportunity Zones had already experienced notable levels
of monetary flow even before their inclusion in the Program.
Furthermore, a report issued by Hilary Gelfond and Adam Looney of
the Brookings Institution arrived at a similar verdict: while some
Zones clearly are in distress, others not so much.106 States, Gelfond
and Looney concluded, “could have targeted more of their Zones to
places in deeper distress.”107
Wrongful designations threaten the Opportunity Zone Program’s
goal of lifting up low-income communities in several ways. In areas
already seeing steady levels of economic investment and
revitalization, channeling funds into projects that would have
inevitably occurred regardless of a federal tax incentive draws
budgeted funds away from the other low-income tracts that did not
make the final cut for the Program. Several states either maxed out

100. Id. at 5.
101. See, e.g., GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92, at 5; THEODOS ET AL., supra
note 59, at 3.
102. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3, 10–11 (discussing how investment flows
to tracts were scored based on four components: commercial lending, multifamily
lending, single-family lending, and small business lending. Since there is not currently
information available about existing equity flows “at small areas of geography across
the dimensions of interest,” debt flows are another means of understanding local
access to capital).
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 5.
106. See generally GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92.
107. Id. at 5.
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or came close to maxing out their nomination slates by putting forth
the full 25% of eligible tracts, meaning that in these states, threequarters of low-income Zones are now without funding, and
possibility even development, at the expense of Zones that may not
truly require either.108 Storey County, Nevada, for example, became
a designated Opportunity Zone at the expense of Dayton, Nevada, a
far more impoverished neighborhood.109
Channeling funding into areas that are already undergoing
revitalization may also end up harming the very individuals the
Opportunity Zone Program seeks to aid. Critics of the legislation see
the expansion and creation of new local businesses and the
rehabilitation of existing property in these distressed zones as, at best,
“an optimistic scenario.”110 To them, the Program’s tax incentives are
a so-called “subsidy for gentrification,” and here, gentrification is far
from a positive thing.111 Incentivizing tax breaks correlates, perhaps
inevitably, with high business profitability, property values, and rent
rates, given investors’ interest in high returns on their investment.
Economic theory suggests that high returns on investment “will flow
to [investments] in the fastest gentrifying areas.”112 Meanwhile, as
these businesses move in, local residents may be displaced out for the
individuals with the educational credentials and incomes to qualify for
and afford these jobs and lifestyles.113 As high-rise, luxury apartment
buildings soar in these Zones, the current residents of the

108. State-by-State
Analysis,
URBAN
INST.,
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/urban_statesozs_update.xlsx (last visited
Oct.28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/UP6F-UTCV] (showing states like California and
New York maxed out their nominations for designating Opportunity Zones); see also
Pennsylvania Submits Nominations, supra note 62 (noting that the state nominated
its maximum of 300 tracts).
109. GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92, at 7. Dayton, Nevada, unlike Storey
County, is a true “economically depressed neighborhood that lacks Storey County’s
huge industrial center.” Damian Paletta, After Nevada GOP Push, Treasury
Changed Lucrative Policy Benefitting One County, WASH. POST. (June 22, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/after-nevada-gop-push-treasuryquietly-changed-policy-benefiting-one-county/2018/06/22/d142acfc-74c5-11e8-b4b7308400242c2e_story.html [https://perma.cc/U8XW-LD2N]. While Storey County’s
median income is $65,608, Lyon County’s median income — where Dayton is located
— sits at just $49,007. Id.
110. Looney, supra note 14.
111. Id.
112. Id.; see also THEODOS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3 (“[I]n communities already
experiencing high levels of socioeconomic change further investment places low-and
moderate-income residents at risk of displacement, and therefore Opportunity Zones
in these areas may be less likely to result in benefits for residents in need.”).
113. See Looney, supra note 14.
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neighborhood may find themselves unable to afford the increased
rent rates that comes with upgrading these areas, not to mention the
increased cost of living.114 States themselves may also feel pressured
to maximize the Program’s tax benefits to their citizens and
developers, and consequently could push for qualified funds to invest
in already-gentrifying neighborhoods which “are guaranteed to have
large capital gains,” as opposed to deeply distressed areas where
investment is speculative at best.115 Thus, despite the Program’s
purpose to create opportunities for the individuals living in these
distressed neighborhoods, that goal may not come to fruition for
current residents living in Opportunity Zones.116
C. The Opportunity Zone Program Has Not Accounted for the
Failures of Similar Zoning Programs
In a way, the Opportunity Zone Program is not the first economic
development policy of its kind. In the past 40 years, the U.S. has seen
two programs with similar goals to that of the Opportunity Zone
Program: Enterprise Zones and the New Market Tax Credits.

i. Enterprise Zones
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the majority of states implemented
Enterprise Zone legislation, which cited aims very similar to that of
the Opportunity Zone Program — to “provide tax preferences to
capital and/or labor and other development incentives in an attempt
to induce investment expansion or location, and to enhance
employment opportunities for residents in depressed areas.”117 Like
Opportunity Zones, Enterprise Zones also relied primarily on
private-sector investment.118 Typical Enterprise Zone programs
provide tax incentives such as subsidies to capital or labor, or both, to

114. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3 (“With respect to benefit, low-and
moderate-income residents will need to be able to afford to remain their communities
as the areas the areas upgrade — not be displaced — if they are to benefit from the
gains Opportunity Zones bring.”).
115. Looney, supra note 14.
116. See 164 CONG. REC. S667-05 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2018) (statement of Sen. Tim
Scott).
117. Leslie E. Papke, What Do We Know About Enterprise Zones?, 7 TAX POL’Y
& ECON. 37, 38 (1993); see also ALAN H. PETERS & PETER S. FISHER, W.E. UPJOHN
INST. FOR EMP. RES., STATE ENTERPRISE ZONE PROGRAMS: HAVE THEY WORKED?.
23 (2002) (noting how Enterprise Zone policy geographically targeted economically
depressed areas in need of regeneration). Between 1981 and 1991, 39 states and the
District of Columbia adopted some form of Enterprise Zone programming. Id. at 1.
118. PETERS & FISHER, supra note 117, at 23.
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lower the cost for businesses in the area. In theory, business and
production in those areas would, in turn, increase.119 A labor subsidy,
for example, would lower labor costs, increase the use of labor as well
as capital, and bolster output and employment.120
Even before the federal government authorized Enterprise Zones,
their effectiveness was called into question.121
Tax induced
investment in distressed Zones, the naysayers argued, was merely
investment relocated from somewhere else and in essence, a “zerosum game for the country as a whole.”122 On the other hand,
investment into these areas could both incentivize an existing business
to relocate to those neighborhoods and stimulate new businesses that
otherwise may not have been inclined to begin in those
neighborhoods, which in turn could produce taxable profits and
incomes to reduce the revenue cost of the tax incentives.123
By and large, Enterprise Zones were considered failures both
domestically and abroad.124 Alan H. Peters and Peter S. Fisher
conducted an extensive study that thoroughly examined Enterprise
Zones across multiple states, concluding that Enterprise Zones were

119. Papke, supra note 117, at 41 (noting how, in theory, these subsidies should
“tend to increase zone production”).
120. See id. (discussing how subsidies to both capital and labor can increase
Enterprise Zones’ production by both encouraging existing firms to increase
production and by promoting new firms to relocate and expand into the Enterprise
Zones so that they can benefit from these tax incentives). Labor subsidies include
employer tax credits for new employees, employee income tax credits, and job
training tax credits, amongst others. Id. at 49.
121. See id. at 38–39 (discussing the criticism of Enterprise Zoning programs).
Enterprise Zones were first authorized under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, which allowed for the designation of nine Empowerment Zones and
ninety-five Enterprise Zones. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93), Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 543 (1993).
122. Papke, supra note 117, at 39.
123. Id. at 39, 41.
124. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, Enterprise Zones: A Bipartisan Failure, FISCAL
TIMES
(Jan.
10,
2014),
https://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2014/01/10/Enterprise-Zones-BipartisanFailure [https://perma.cc/7NNV-JYAC] (noting that Enterprise Zones are “at best a
very weak generator of jobs” and that there was “no significant difference in
economic growth or job creation inside the enterprise zones from the surrounding
area”); California’s Enterprise Zone Program Fails to Create Jobs, PUB. POL’Y INST.
CAL., https://www.ppic.org/press-release/californias-enterprise-zone-program-fails-tocreate-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/9SE4-EEC5] (last visited Apr. 7, 2019) (stating that the
Enterprise Zone Program “failed to achieve its key goal: increasing jobs”); PETERS &
FISHER, supra note 117, at xi (noting that Enterprise Zones’ implementation at the
state level “has not been a success”); Papke, supra note 117, at 47 (“[The] British
zone program has failed in its goal of generating new industrial activity.”).
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unsuccessful for several reasons.125 According to Peters and Fisher’s
calculations, the Enterprise Zone Program created roughly 9% of
induced jobs.126 For these Enterprise Programs to be successful,
however, cities would need at least 30% in induced jobs to come out
ahead.127 Additionally, states with Enterprise Zones also saw a net
loss of establishments under such programming and averaged a 1.2%
decline in businesses and establishments per year over six years due
to a “pronounced comparative disadvantage” in attracting and
holding onto capital-intensive sectors of manufacturing.128 Enterprise
Zone programming also failed to create employment for low-income
community-residents, as the Zones ended up attracting the majority
of its workers from commuters living outside the areas.129 Other
research concluded that Enterprise Zones did nothing at all for the
communities involved.130
British Enterprise Zones, which focused primarily on industrial and
commercial revitalization in mostly vacant and deteriorating
industrial neighborhoods experiencing under population, were
unsuccessful, too.131 Surveys did not find any real difference between
employment creation, investment behaviors, or business between
Enterprise Zones and non-Enterprise Zones.132 These surveys
further noted that only 25% of new jobs within these areas were
induced jobs.133 Other studies quantified the cost of the British

125. PETERS & FISHER, supra note 117, at xi (discussing how Enterprise Zones also
fail to influence business decisions).
126. Id. at 10 (defining induced jobs as jobs that would not have existed in the
Enterprise Zone but for the inducement packages).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 11–12 (noting that while 11 Zones experienced net growth of over 10%,
24 Zones experienced declines of 15% or more).
129. Id. at 14 (noting that the commute time for workers in Enterprise Zones was,
on average, longer than that of workers employed elsewhere in regions that
contained Enterprise Zones, suggesting that proximity between home and
employment did not necessarily improve employment accessibility).
130. See BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 16, at 8 (noting that research into
Enterprise Zones “found little impact of the programs on local job markets” and that
it was not possible to tie any improvements in poverty and unemployment to
Enterprise Zoning).
131. TIMOTHY P.R. WEAVER, BLAZING THE NEOLIBERAL TRAIL: URBAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (2015); see also Papke, supra
note 117, at 47.
132. Papke, supra note 117, at 47.
133. Id.
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Enterprise Zone Program and estimated that each induced job
created cost between $35,000 to $45,000 in lost revenue.134
Several theories have been put forth speculating as to why
Enterprise Zone programming failed as spectacularly as it did. For
one, businesses learned how to circumvent the system and engaged in
rent-seeking behavior by relocating businesses just outside of an
Enterprise Zone into one.135 High tax rates, furthermore, were never
the reason why businesses failed to invest in Enterprise Zones before
they were even designated as such.136 Rather, the lack of educated
laborers, transportation, and a moneyed population in these areas
drove away potential investment.137
Enterprise Zone policy
neglected to address these issues.

ii. The New Markets Tax Credit
Like both Enterprise and Opportunity Zones, the New Market Tax
Credits (NMTC)138 encourages investment in distressed zones by
providing institutions and individuals with federal income tax credits
for investing in Community Development Entities (CDE).139 CDEs
are specialized financial vehicles created to provide loans, fund
investments, and counsel low income communities in financial
matters.140 Much like qualified funds, CDEs make equity investments
into low-income communities141 and businesses, and in turn, taxable

134. Timothy Weaver, The Problem With Opportunity Zones, CITYLAB (May 16,
2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/05/the-problem-with-opportunityzones/560510/ [https://perma.cc/ZK2Q-ZKKH]. While proponents of the British
Enterprise Zone Program cite Canary Wharf, a previously dilapidated neighborhood
turned financial hub as an example of the Program’s success, Canary Wharf is also
still home to some of the most income-deprived households in the United Kingdom.

Id.

135. Bartlett, supra note 124.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
139. DONALD J. MARPLES & SEAN LOWRY, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT: AN
INTRODUCTION
1
(2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34402.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MH2Z-PQH5]; see also MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL ET AL., NEW
MARKETS TAX CREDIT (NMTC) PROGRAM EVALUATION 2 (2013),
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/NMTC%20Program%20Evaluation%20Final%2
0Report.pdf 3 [https://perma.cc/VH6L-JD9D].
140. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 139, at 2.
141. Id. at 3 (stating that like the Opportunity Zone Program, qualifying “lowincome communities . . . have at least one of the following criteria: (1) has a poverty
rate of at least 20%, (2) is located in a metropolitan area with a median family income
below 80% of the greater of the statewide or metropolitan area median family
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investors earn tax credits, which they are eligible to claim at 5% for
the first three years, then at 6% for the subsequent four years as long
as the investments remain in those communities.142
While the NMTC has not fared as poorly as Enterprise Zones have
in the public eye,143 it has received its fair share of criticism, too.144
One study of the NMTC suggests that while funds may have shifted
from high to low-income communities, there is also no evidence
pointing to any increase from corporations in their investment
levels.145 This phenomenon suggests that corporations may be
receiving credits for investments they would have made regardless of
tax incentives.146 The NMTC has also been criticized as overly
confusing and difficult to navigate, even for the financial institutions
directly involved in funding and loaning procedures.147 It also lacks
controls and regulation to prevent excessive rates of return, potential
duplication of benefits, and high costs.148 Furthermore, while the
NMTC did create jobs, on average, each job created cost $53,162 in
income, or (3) is located outside a metropolitan area, with a median family income
below 80% of the median statewide family income.”).
142. Id. (noting that there are four types of qualified low-income community
investments: (1) loans or investments to qualified low-income community businesses;
(2) provision of financial counseling; (3) loans or investments in other CDEs; and (4)
the purchase of loans from other CDEs).
143. See, e.g., Paul Anderson, The NMTC, Business Financing, and
Entrepreneurship, NEW MKTS. TAX CREDIT COAL. (Feb. 21, 2018),
http://nmtccoalition.org/2018/02/21/the-nmtc-business-financing-andentrepreneurship/ [https://perma.cc/T6J5-MVQG] (praising the NMTC’s hand in
creating construction employment, even though such jobs may be temporary); Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, $3.5 Billion in New Markets Tax Credits
Awarded to Spur Economic Growth Nationwide (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-release/sm0288 [https://perma.cc/T7KU-B73C]
(noting that the NMTC has created 750,000 jobs and led to the construction and
rehabilitation of over 190 million square feet of commercial real estate)
144. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 16, at 9–11 (stating that the
NMTC is “overcomplicated”); MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 139, at 7 (suggesting
that the NMTC be simplified and that geographic distribution of activity has been
concentrated into only a few states).
145. Tami Gurley-Calvez et al., Do Tax Incentives Affect Investment? An
Analysis of the New Markets Tax Credit, 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 371, 373 (2009).
146. Id.
147. See JAMES R. WHITE ET AL., NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT: BETTER CONTROLS
AND
DATA ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE EFFECTIVENESS 10 (2014),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664717.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLT5-XB9P] (stating
that the NMTC financial structure has only “become more complex and less
transparent over time”); Roshan Rajabi, Inside the New Markets Tax Credit
Program: Who Is the Real Winner?, BOLLER REV. 296, 298–303 (2017) (discussing
how “many . . . in the field of finance — commercial banking specifically — are
unclear on what the NMTC program is”).
148. WHITE ET AL., supra note 147, at 12.
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tax credits, and the number created was small when squared against
the cost.149 The leeway in the NMTC’s definition of “low-income
community” ensures almost all neighborhoods, even historically
affluent ones like Beverly Hills and the Hamptons, could stand to
benefit from the program.150
The problems that plagued Enterprise Zones and the NMTC are
present in Opportunity Zone programming, too. Opportunity Zone
programming, much like Enterprise Zone programming, does not
currently account for businesses interested in gaming the system, nor
does it regulate for non-zone residents usurping employment
opportunities meant for residents within these low-income Zones.151
Furthermore, the Opportunity Zone Program uses the same
definition of low-income communities the NMTC adopted.152 Even
now, there is evidence that some designated Opportunity Zones may
already be on the road to gentrification and thus, may not require or
benefit from supplemental funding as much as other zones.153
Furthermore, like the NMTC, the Opportunity Zone Program has
also been criticized for being confusing and complicated; the delay in
clarification and additional regulations has only exacerbated these
concerns.154 Without regulation and policy addressing the areas
where Enterprise Zones and the NMTC faltered, the Opportunity
Zone Program may fall victim to the same pitfalls given the
similarities in the legislation and overarching purpose.

149. Bartlett, supra note 124.
150. See TOM COBURN, BANKING ON THE POOR: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA
EXPLOITS STRUGGLING COMMUNITIES TO COLLECT NEW MARKET TAX CREDITS i
(2014).
151. Bartlett, supra note 124 (addressing how a lack of educated individuals,
transportation, and a moneyed population in Enterprise Zones may have contributed
to its failure). See generally I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017).
152. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2017); see also MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 139, at
3.
153. See Looney, supra note 14 (discussing how some Census data defining lowincome communities date back to 2011, and that possibly half of the low-income
zones in the District of Columbia, Seattle, Portland, Minneapolis, and Atlanta may
already be gentrified).
154. See Partner Insights, Opportunity Zones: The Do’s and Don’ts of Real
Estate’s Most Exciting Investment Vehicle, COM. OBSERVER (Dec. 11, 2018, 2:50
PM), https://commercialobserver.com/2018/12/opportunity-zones-the-dos-and-dontsof-real-estates-most-exciting-new-investment-vehicle/ [https://perma.cc/8FTE-95ZF]
(calling Opportunity Zones “exciting, but often confusing”); see also Robert D. Matt,
FAQ: Understanding Opportunity Zones, KAUFMAN ROSSIN (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://kaufmanrossin.com/blog/faq-understanding-opportunity-zones/
[https://perma.cc/8TH7-A74C] (calling Opportunity Zones “complicated”); Nagel,
supra note 73 (stating that investors have been hesitant to move forward).
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III. MOVING FORWARD: WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
This Note proposes measures that the IRS, the Treasury
Department, and the states themselves can take in an effort to ensure
the Opportunity Zone Program truly benefits the intended lowincome communities and their residents. Section III.A suggests
measures the IRS and the Treasury Department should adopt going
forward to better ensure that investors are not deterred away from
participation due to lack of knowledge, and that as much
transparency and oversight is included as possible. Section III.B then
puts forth measures state officials can undertake to better ensure that
their low-income communities and residents are truly the areas and
individuals benefitting from the Opportunity Zone Program.
A. What the IRS and the Treasury Department Can Do

i. The IRS and Treasury Department Should Continue to Clarify the
Existing Regulations
The second set of regulations the IRS promulgated on April 17,
2019 is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, as the agency has
stepped forth and clarified several key components of the Program
that required further explanation. The 169-page document has
provided useful clarification as to what “50 percent of a business’ total
gross income” means to qualify for the tax incentives,155 how long an
investor has to reinvest gains if he sells an Opportunity Zone asset,156
and what the parameters are for vacant property.157 The regulations
have also provided a more comprehensive definition as to what
“substantially all” means in regards to investment in qualified
Opportunity Zone stock and partnership interest158 and have made it
155. 84 Fed. Reg.. 18,691 (May 1, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1)
(clarifying the three safe harbors a business may comply with to benefit from the
Program’s tax incentives).
156. Id. at 163 (providing investors with a one-year grace period in which to
reinvest gains made from an Opportunity Zone asset into another Opportunity Zone
asset).
157. Id. at 12 (clarifying the purchase of vacant property by a qualified fund — If
the acquired property has been standing vacant for five or more years before the
purchase of such property by the qualified fund, the purchased property will satisfy
the original use requirement).
158. Tony Nitti, IRS Releases Latest Round of Opportunity Zone Regulations:
FORBES
(Apr.
22,
2019),
Where
Do
We
Stand
Now?,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2019/04/22/irs-releases-latest-round-ofopportunity-zone-regulations-where-do-we-stand-now/#3ed372c42772
[https://perma.cc/J9H4-BAAW]; FORM 8996 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 31, at 1–2
(stating that if a qualified fund is investing in stock or a partnership interest, the
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easier for startup companies and existing businesses to become
involved with Opportunity Zones,159 thus potentially diversifying the
real-estate-heavy investments seen so far. Still, however, other pieces
of necessary information remain without clarification.160
While it remains unclear as to whether investors’ concerns have
been sufficiently assuaged with the new regulations, the IRS and the
Treasury Department should continue to address the queries and
concerns in a timely manner if they are serious about achieving the
Program’s goals. Though the IRS and Treasury Department appear
uninterested in issuing a third set of regulations and clarifications, it
may be in the agencies’ best interest to do so, as guidance is still
needed for several key components of the Opportunity Zone
Program.161 2019 is an important year for generating cash flow and
interest in investors, as the 15% step-up in basis on the original
investment will only apply to investments made by the end of the
year.162 To ensure that investors remain interested in the Program —
and perhaps more importantly, that their investments stay within
qualified funds and Opportunity Zone neighborhoods — the IRS

corporation or partnership must be a qualified Opportunity Zone business for
“substantially all” of the time the fund holds the stock or interest). Id. at 7–9. The
second set of Regulations defines “substantially all” as at least 90% of the qualified
fund’s holding period. Id. at 1–2.
159. Michael Cohn, Opportunity Zone Rules Aim to Spur Further Business and
ACCT.
TODAY
(Apr.
23,
2019),
Real
Estate
Investment,
https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/opportunity-zone-rules-aim-to-spur-furtherbusiness-and-real-estate-investment [https://perma.cc/5FUH-DAYT] (noting that the
safe harbors in the new regulations have made it easier for startup companies and
existing businesses to participate in the Program too).
160. See id. (directing investors back to the original definition of “substantially
improve” in the legislation, the same definition that initially confused investors); see
also Tankersley, supra note 42 (discussing how agencies have yet to clarify how
important data will be collected).
161. See Lydia O’Neal, No Plan for Third Round of Opportunity Zone Rules,
BLOOMBERG
(May
13,
2019,
2:00
PM),
Officials
Say,
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/no-plan-for-third-round-ofopportunity-zone-rules-officials-say [https://perma.cc/LG7C-PCRB] (reporting that
the IRS and Treasury Department have no plan for a third set of regulations).
Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel Krishna Vallabhaneni stated “I don’t know what
would even be in a third reg [sic]” despite parties calling for guidance on anti-abuse,
de-certification, and penalties, amongst others. Id.
162. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017) (stating that capital gains tax on original
investments channeled into qualified funds may only be deferred until December 31,
2026); see also Matthew Rothstein, Delays Could Be Good News for Philadelphia,
BISNOW (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.bisnow.com/philadelphia/news/opportunityzones/opportunity-zone-deadline-different-investments-good-news-98359
[https://perma.cc/4NRT-56QL] (discussing how the 15% step-up in basis only applies
to investments made by the end of 2019).
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must continue to provide clarity on key components of the Program
before both the end of 2019 and before the 15% step-up in basis
incentive terminates. Or else, they risk losing both investments and
investors’ interest.163

ii. The IRS and Treasury Department Should Regulate Opportunity
Zones That May Not Be as Distressed as Others
To help low-income neighborhoods and their residents, legislation
and programming must actually be directed towards these areas.
Currently, the evidence demonstrates some of the designated Zones
may not be as distressed as the outdated data suggests that they
are.164 Though tracts have already been designated as Opportunity
Zones and no current provision exists in the legislation to remove, redesignate, or otherwise alter the designation of tracts, the IRS could
still put forth additional regulations to more accurately target
distressed areas in need of Opportunity Zone funding.
For one, several college towns were selected as Opportunity Zones
due to their high qualifying poverty rates.165 Other selected tracts
may be well on the road to gentrification already. Several designated
neighborhoods have seen millions of dollars in new investment in the
past couple of years and bear the signs of revitalization: a flagship
Whole Foods and a Trader Joe’s, new sports arenas, and
headquarters for technology darlings like AirBnB and Uber.166 While
the tracts may have qualified for nomination based on the definition
of “low-income community,” the census data used to define these
Zones is outdated and thus, fails to accurately capture a true picture

163. While interested investors can still qualify for a 10% step-up in basis if they
invest into Opportunity Zones after 2019, since an investment must be held for at
least seven years by December 31, 2026 to qualify for a full 15% step-up in basis,
investors will lose the extra 5% step-up in basis if they do not invest by the end of
2019. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2017).
164. See discussion, supra Section II.B; see also GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note
92, at 1, 5 (stating that it is “obvious” that to help individuals in distressed
neighborhoods, those neighborhoods actually need to be targeted).
165. See GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92, at 9–10 (noting how “subsidizing
college campuses is not what Congress intended” in regard to Opportunity Zone
programming). The neighborhood housing the University of Southern California in
Los Angeles, located in Census Tract 222700 has an official poverty rate is 88%, and
yet, 99% of its residents are enrolled in college. Id.
166. See Looney, supra note 14 (pointing out that San Francisco’s SoMa
neighborhood qualifies as a designated Opportunity Zone, even though it is home to
trendy supermarkets and sporting goods stores) Several other major cities also are
home to “gentrifying hotspots” that nevertheless, qualify as Opportunity Zones. Id.
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of what a Zone looks like.167 Establishing a more accurate definition
of a low-income community168 and updating census data to better
catalog the nation’s distressed zones should be a priority for the IRS
moving forward.169
In doing so, the federal government would have a clearer
understanding of exactly which Zones are, in fact, distressed, and
could implement regulations that guard against exploitation of the
Program accordingly.
Regulations guarding against excessive
investment in illusory low-income communities — that is, college
towns with inflated poverty levels and already-gentrifying
neighborhoods — could be put into place.170 A cap on the dollaramount spent, or a restriction on the number of projects carried out in
these particular Opportunity Zones could help counteract investors’
tendency to seek for high returns in investment in the areas
gentrifying most rapidly.171 More stringent restrictions on the types
of projects that may be carried out in these illusory Zones may prove
useful, too. The majority of the projects stimulated thus far under the
Opportunity Zone Program have been real estate ventures such as
luxury apartment buildings and hotel developments.172 However,

167. See id. (pointing out that the Treasury Department relied on maps of census
data, some of which dated back to 2011).
168. GELFOND & LOONEY, see supra note 92, 8–10. One measure that could be
implemented in redefining poverty and low-income communities could be to exclude
students from the census count. Another could be to look for additional indicators of
distress, such as child poverty rates when designating low-income communities. Id.
169. See Looney, supra note 14.
170. See FORM 8996 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 31, at 1–2 (stating that while
qualified funds themselves must invest at least 90% of their funds into qualified
Opportunity Zone property, stock, interest, business, or business property per year,
there are no minimum or maximum thresholds an Opportunity Zone itself must meet
to qualify as such. Therefore, state-imposed regulations as described above would
still be within the statutory guidelines); see also GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92,
at 12 (noting that it is “incumbent on states and localities to direct investments” and
that they have available to them the “tools they’ve used before — zoning, local hiring
requirements, property or other tax incentives, preservation, [and] assistance to
homeowners”).
171. See Looney, supra note 14.
172. See Cresset Fund, supra note 68 (detailing a luxury apartment under
development in a Houston, Texas Opportunity Zone); Tankersley, Investors, supra
note 75 (describing a SpringHill Suites by Marriott hotel project under development
in Phoenix, Arizona). Though the additional regulations have expanded the types of
eligible businesses to “service transactions and employee location,” it remains to be
seen whether qualified funds will end up diversifying their portfolios or if they will
continue to invest in profitable luxury living real estate. Mary Childs, Opportunity
Zones Just Got Clearer, Giving Investors a Green Light, BARRON’S (Apr. 19, 2019,
1:13 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/opportunity-zone-rules-tax-investments51555693905 [https://perma.cc/3L3Z-YU24]; see also DC Opportunity Zones,
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these projects may not be all that beneficial to the residents living in
these neighborhoods, who may not be able to afford rent on an
apartment with all the bells and whistles. Creating and enforcing
regulations that curtails the displacement of residents in distressed
communities or that draws in employees from outside the Zones by
limiting investment opportunities would better ensure that the
Program truly benefits those it is intended to benefit.

iii. The IRS and Treasury Department Should Implement Data
Collection and Monitoring Systems
In April, the Treasury Department issued a request for information
seeking public input on data collection and tracking as it relates to
investment in qualified opportunity funds, alongside the second set of
regulations issued by the IRS.173 Unsurprisingly, critics have panned
this part of the Program’s lag, given the many months the respective
agencies have had to consider and address this data collection
deficiency.174 Since the Opportunity Zone Program is run through
the tax code and the benefit exists in the form of capital gains —
which are typically reported only when an asset is sold, without
additional oversight — much of the Program’s day-to-day operation
will go unchecked.175 This leaves the Program wide open for abuse:
there are no systems in place to gather information about what
projects are being developed, how qualified funds are gathering and
BISNOW,
https://www.bisnow.com/events/washington-dc/DC-Opportunity-Zones1346 [https://perma.cc/ETP5-4DAH ] (last visited May 13, 2019) (noting that “highend condominiums, luxury apartments, high-rise hotels, towering offices, and chic
retail and restaurants” are rising at “an astonishing pace” in low-income areas in
D.C.).
173. REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, supra note 78.
174. See Tankersly, Treasury Issues Rules, supra note 42 (quoting Olugbenga
Ajilore, a senior economist with the Center for American Progress, who commented
that “[t]his [Program] has been in place for 17 months and now you’re going to ask
for comments about data collection? . . . There needs to be some accountability to the
community.”); see also Olugbenga Ajilore, Treasury’s Second Set of Guidelines for
Opportunity Zones Still Leaves Struggling Communities Behind, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS
(Apr.
25,
2019),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2019/04/25/469039/treasuryssecond-set-guidelines-opportunity-zones-still-leaves-struggling-communities-behind/
[https://perma.cc/YF84-MG7V ] (“As it now stands, there is nothing in the new rules
that ensures investors have any, let alone meaningful, engagement with distressed
communities. There is nothing in the rules that ensures private capital will be
deployed beyond a few major metropolitan areas.”).
175. See Tankersley, Treasury Issues Rules, supra note 42 (discussing how § 1202,
providing for the exclusion of gains on small business stock, presents a cautionary tale
for Opportunity Zone monitoring, as there is “no concurrent information on how
investors are using the provision”).
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dispersing their monies, and how well, or not, the Program is
benefitting the communities and the residents it is supposed to.176
The Treasury Department and the IRS must install the proper data
collection and monitoring tools to track the Program’s effectiveness.
As it is, the Opportunity Zone Program has drawn its fair share of
criticism and been denounced as nothing more than a “subsidy for
gentrification.”177 To combat these real fears, the IRS and the
Treasury Department must do more to demonstrate that the
Program’s effectiveness is an important concern. Adding weight to
critics’ fears that accountability to the community has not been a
priority thus far, is based on the fact that no meaningful systems were
put into place after 17 months to check the activity of qualified funds,
and these agencies are only now beginning to turn their attention
towards data collection.178 Moving forward, the IRS and the Treasury
Department must take into account the comments it receives from
the public in regard to data collection, and collaborate with proper
state institutions and organizations to gather the necessary
information so as to properly asses the Opportunity Zone Program —
and whether or not it is achieving its goals.
B. What the States Can Do

i. States Should Promote a Local Mindset
Much of the criticism of Enterprise Zone programming revolved
around the induced jobs created, and specifically, that few of the
residents within Enterprise Zones benefitted from the opportunities
generated.179 Commuting times demonstrated that only a small
portion of the Enterprise Zone residents actually worked within these
zones, suggesting that many of the Enterprise Zone-created
employment opportunities were not in fact taken by the residents
they were created for.180 The rapid gentrification of these distressed
neighborhoods, furthermore, may lead to both the displacement of
their residents unable to afford the skyrocketing cost of living in such
areas and the entry of a population with higher incomes and

176. See id. (stating that there must be accountability to the community).
177. See Looney, supra note 14.
178. See Tankersley, Treasury Issues Rules, supra note 42.
179. See PETERS & FISHER, supra note 117, at 197–215 (noting how Enterprise
Zone programming has likely done little to increase accessibility of employment
opportunities to the individuals living in low-income communities); see also supra
Section II.C.i.
180. See PETERS & FISHER, supra note 117, at 208.
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education.181 While there are currently no provisions or measures in
place to prevent the Opportunity Zone programming from falling
victim to the same pitfalls that plagued the Enterprise Zone
programming,182 states must do their part in promoting practices and
policies that encourage a local mindset, lest it fall victim to a similar
eventuality.
For one, the states could promote so-called smart-gentrification —
“policies to retain local residents and preserve or expand low-and
middle-income housing,” even while participating in Opportunity
Zone programming.183 Smart gentrification posits that gentrification
in and of itself may not be completely detrimental to low-income
families, as certain improvements in neighborhood services may be
beneficial to the original population.184
Instead of restoring
deteriorating buildings into hotels and headquarters for booming
technology companies, states could encourage investors to turn this
real estate into community centers and institutions that will enhance
services and education in the neighborhood.185 Instead of developing
luxury apartment buildings with amenities that will inevitably price
and displace local residents out of their communities, states could
instead promote the creation of affordable housing that low-income
families can afford.186 Rather than permitting moneyed companies
that require high levels of education and skillsets for employment to
sweep up large tracts of cheap, available real estate in these
neighborhoods, states could instead support local businesses and local
hiring initiatives that Opportunity Zone residents could actually
benefit from.187
While gentrification does not look the same from neighborhood to
neighborhood, the effects of rapid gentrification will almost certainly

181. See THEODOS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3 (noting that “low-and-moderate
income residents will need to be able to afford to remain in their communities as the
areas upgrade”).
182. See GELFOND & LOONEY, supra note 92, at 12 (suggesting that the
Opportunity Zone Program apply guardrails to account for the fact that there “is
little to direct federal subsidies”).
183. Looney, supra note 14 (defining smart gentrification).
184. Jonathan Grabinsky & Stuart M. Butler, The Anti-Poverty Case for “Smart”
BROOKINGS
INST.
(Feb.
11,
2015),
Gentrification,
Part
2,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2015/02/11/the-anti-povertycase-for-smart-gentrification-part-2/ [https://perma.cc/ZKG9-D65G] (discussing the
benefits and drawbacks of smart gentrification).
185. See id.
186. See THEODOS ET AL., supra note 59, at 3 (noting that residents need to be able
to afford the cost of living in their developing communities).
187. See Li, supra note 56 (supporting local hiring requirements).
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be adverse on the neighborhoods and residents in question.188 Some
cities have already begun using their regulatory powers to combat
some of the perils of speedy gentrification.189 The District of
Columbia, for example, has begun requiring developers to preserve or
expand affordable housing alongside higher-priced housing.190 The
smart gentrification effort, an undertaking known as “revitalization
without gentrification,” channels $550 million into the historic
African American community Barry Farm, to create 1400 public and
affordable apartments and recreational and educational centers.191
After the project is complete, all former residents will be invited back
to the new development — no one will be displaced, the city has
pledged.192 In Portland, the Cully Main Street Plan sought to
preserve the Cully neighborhood’s cultural character and diversity
even as the neighborhood underwent revitalization and
development.193 The Cully Main Street Plan’s efforts appear to have
been successful thus far. In 2017, the neighborhood’s “adult super
center,” home to three strip clubs, an adult video establishment, and a
lingerie shop, was transformed into a 150-unit affordable housing
complex, a project reflecting the understanding that many residents in
the Cully community are young, intergenerational families in need of
such housing.194 In Ohio, Walnut Hills, a predominately African
American neighborhood in Cincinnati, residents are pushing against
the kind of rapid gentrification seen in both Cincinnati’s downtown

188. See Grabinsky & Butler, supra note 184.
189. See id. (“Some cities, such as Washington DC, have started using their
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(last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
191. Id.
192. Id. (stating “[t]here will be zero displacement”).
193. See PORTLAND BUREAU OF PLANNING & SUSTAINABILITY, CULLY MAIN
STREET & LOCAL STREET PLANS IMPLEMENTATION REPORT 2 (2012),
https://www.oregon.gov/LCD/TGM/TGMProducts/1D-10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U9TH-FAA7] (discussing the Plan’s goals to preserve “an attractive
main street for residents to gather with locally-run family-serving businesses that
reflect the diversity of the community” as the neighborhood undergoes
development).
194. Amanda Waldroupe, So Long, Sugar Shack: Affordable Housing Planned at
STREET
ROOTS
NEWS
(Nov.
3,
2017),
Living
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https://news.streetroots.org/2017/11/03/so-long-sugar-shack-affordable-housingplanned-living-cully-plaza [https://perma.cc/A7FY-5RYP].
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and Over-the-Rhine (OTR) neighborhoods.195 When Walnut Hills
residents saw “hipsters from all over the city” flocking to their
neighborhood to enjoy new pop-up eateries and biergartens, they
took their concerns to the Walnut Hill Redevelopment Foundation,
claiming that the influx of redevelopment “was helping the outside,
bringing people in, but not [helping] the neighborhood.”196 With the
Foundation’s help and development of neighborhood-conscious
programming, such as the Walnut Hills Reinvestment Plan, which
supports the development of low-income housing, “the biergartens
stopped.”197 Given the potentially harmful effects the Opportunity
Zone Program could hoist upon the very communities and individuals
it is meant to lift-up, states participating in the Opportunity Zone
Program should endeavor to engage in smart gentrification projects
that promote local businesses and hiring, community and educational
projects, and affordable housing.
CONCLUSION
Though still nascent, the Opportunity Zone Program represents
the potential to lift-up low-income, distressed communities, and their
residents. However, the Program should address and improve upon
several areas, including its current disorganization, the inaccurate
designation of several Zones, and the potential for it to fall victim to
similar failures of plagued past land zoning initiatives. Continuing to
address investors’ concerns in a timely manner, regulating and
restricting the types of projects and the amount of investments
developed in qualified Opportunity Zones, implementing data
collection and monitoring systems to assess the Program’s progress
and effectiveness at both the state and federal level, and promoting a
local mindset will better ensure that the Opportunity Zones will truly
benefit low-income communities and their residents.
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